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A Genealogy of Home Visits: Explaining
the Relentless Search for Individualized
Information Without Individual
Suspicion
By PETER MICEK*
The principles are clear and explicit. The free market is fine for the third
world and its growing counterpart at home. Mothers with dependent chil-
dren can be sternly lectured on the need for self-reliance, but not dependent
executives and investors, please. For them, the welfare state must flourish.
—Noam Chomsky1
Introduction
THE HOME HOLDS A SACRED PLACE in American mythology.
From the Third and Fourth Amendments2 to the Due Process Clause,3
the Constitution is often invoked to protect most Americans’ homes
from invasion by government forces. Welfare recipients, however,
have not been so fortunate. Courts have upheld warrantless, suspi-
cionless searches of their homes by referencing, among other things,
welfare recipients’ assumed consent and their relationship with the
government, and the rehabilitative—or, at least, non-punitive—goal
of public assistance distribution.4 Welfare recipients are not synony-
mous with poor people, but it is worth noting that courts usually up-
hold the rights of the poor only when some other important right or
* J.D. Candidate, University of San Francisco School of Law, 2011; B.S.,
Northwestern University, 2003. I would like to thank Professor Julie Nice and students in
Poverty Law for their input and guidance. I would also like to thank Lee Ryan for lending
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1. Noam Chomsky, Rollback—Part 1, Z MAGAZINE, Jan. 1995, available at http://www.
chomsky.info/articles/199505—.htm.
2. U.S. CONST. amends. III–IV.
3. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (protecting consenting adult sex-
ual behavior in the home under the Due Process “liberty” interest).
4. See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2006).
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group is at risk.5 The home, when paired with welfare, does not merit
such protection.
Not all “home visits” result in constitutional violations. They are
carried out in a variety of ways in different contexts, from welfare and
food stamp eligibility monitoring to child protection.6 In modern Cal-
ifornia welfare “engagement strategies,” the visits are so widely ac-
cepted that they are currently promoted as a “best practice.”7
Nevertheless, some ongoing uses of home visits raise Constitutional
concerns. Many of the justifications for home visits fail to consider the
way power functions in our complex, modern state and ignore the
underlying purposes of the visits.
This Comment presents a “genealogy” of this long-standing tech-
nique used to produce knowledge about the lives of the poor. Part I
shows the development of welfare monitoring practices. Recent court
decisions approving harsh methods of determining eligibility have re-
ceived widespread condemnation for furthering the stereotype of wel-
fare as charity and emphasizing the individual’s “relationship with the
state.” Explaining the development of the stereotype, Part II outlines
the shift in the type of power exercised throughout the state, which
transformed society from sovereignty to a diffuse and complex admin-
istrative system. Finally, Part III argues extra protection is needed for
the poor in the modern disciplinary power system, which gives offi-
cials all the reason necessary to enter the homes of the needy inde-
pendent of individualized suspicion. Assuming the primacy and
ubiquity of disciplinary power begs a critique of the government-cen-
tric viewpoint of the Special Needs Doctrine. A critique of the blunt
methods approved by the courts explains the failure of home visits to
produce results beyond burdening welfare clients and workers.
5. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982) (education); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (non-
marital children); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (politically unpopu-
lar group); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal
appeal).
6. Telephone Interview with Anastasia Dodson, Senior Policy Analyst, County Wel-
fare Dirs. Ass’n of Cal. (Nov. 4, 2009).
7. E-mail from Anastasia Dodson, Senior Policy Analyst, County Welfare Dirs. Ass’n
of Cal. (Oct. 29, 2009, 8:10:48 PST) (on file with author).
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I. Welfare Eligibility Monitoring: From Poorhomes to Home
Visits
For the state to exercise power over the poor it must know them,
sort them, and mold them into a workable shape. They must become
“‘legible’ or fit into terms, categories, and characteristics that are ob-
servable, assessable, and amenable to the management and informa-
tion regimes of modern bureaucracy.”8 Throughout different eras and
levels of technology and administrative prowess, the collection and
synthesis of knowledge about the poor has attempted to determine
whether the poor are deserving, worthy, or eligible for assistance.9
A. Early American Public Assistance
In order to “know” the poor, in both Britain and colonial
America, an “overseer of the poor” monitored “the collection and de-
livery of aid to the poor and kept careful records of their identity and
whereabouts.”10 Poorhouses developed in the United States as a form
of “indoor relief” adopted from the British model where participants
were required to live, eat, and work inside the institution, often in
uniform and under strict rules and labor mandates.11 The sole source
of relief, the nineteenth century American poorhouses, were very ef-
fective at sorting and controlling the poor, as well as deterring poten-
tial comers through intentionally harsh conditions.12 As in England,
though, “indoor relief” declined toward the end of the nineteenth
century as a result of the creation of the experimental “scientific char-
ity” movement and its methodologies that paved the way for modern
social workers and investigators.13
1. Friendly Visitors and Scientific Charity
As the modern welfare system began, the home visits continued,
though curiously without an official mandate. In part to abolish “out-
door relief” from public view,14 the scientific charity movement began
8. JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIM-
ITS OF PRIVACY 21 (2001).
9. Id. at 22.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 24.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Preston L. Morgan, Comment, Public Assistance for the Price of Privacy: Leaving the
Door Open on Welfare Home Searches, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 227, 230 n.21 (2009) (citing
MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN
AMERICA, 19 (1996)).
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to send “friendly visitors” to the homes of the poor in the United
States15 around the turn of the century. The visitors performed several
functions—advising, supporting, instructing, and inspecting—while
wearing the hats of investigator and friend.16 The government had
taken its hands out of public assistance, for the most part, under the
influence of conservative social Darwinism, but made another inroad
during the progressive Reform Era.17 Mothers’ Pensions, the precur-
sor to the modern Aid to Families with Dependent Children, was es-
tablished by state and local governments between 1910 and 1920 and
gave grants to “deserving,”18 mostly white,19 poor, single mothers with
children.20 The programs only allowed grants to “suitable homes” with
no unrelated male boarders and attached conditions to the aid, justify-
ing continued surveillance and judgment of the poor and their
lifestyles.21
2. The Great Depression to the Second Great Migration
The Great Depression brought the Social Security Act,22 which
created broad, less-stigmatized social welfare programs for the aged
and unemployed, along with more of the same restricted relief for
poor women and children. The Act appropriated funds for aid to de-
pendent children (“ADC”),23 which largely codified the Mothers’ Pen-
sions.24 Though the Act did not mandate that states, which controlled
administration of funds, conduct surveillance of welfare recipients,
the Social Security Board soon recommended that social workers keep
tabs on clients through home visits.25 Such visits were “the norm” until
budget constraints moved the point of interaction to centralized of-
fices, which clients preferred. Still, though, public assistance recipi-
ents were assumed to have “fewer privacy rights than others.”26
15. GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 24.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 24–25.
18. Id. at 25 (quoting LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND
THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890–1935, at 37 (1994)).
19. Morgan, supra note 14, at 231 n.32.
20. Id.
21. GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 25.
22. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1305 (1940).
23. Id. § 601–605.
24. Morgan, supra note 14, at 232.
25. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE, 1890–1935, at 296 (1994).
26. Id. In modern legal contexts, “privacy” has a “narrow” scope, meaning that it is not
necessarily applicable to the eligibility determinations of welfare recipients. Telephone In-
terview with Liz Schott, Ctr. on Budget and Pol’y Priorities, (Oct. 7, 2009). In particular,
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For the first couple of decades, public assistance programs mainly
served the elderly, but by the mid-1950s, ADC represented the major-
ity of the need. Increased welfare eligibility restrictions popped up as
more diverse groups, including African Americans on the second wave
of the Great Migration,27 joined the rolls.28 State after state instituted
eligibility determinations, including the “suitable home” and “man-in-
the-house” policies, and enforced through such tactics as “midnight
raids,” i.e., nighttime or early morning home visits, looking for unre-
ported sources of financial support.29
B. The Rise and Fall of Legal Resistance
As part of urban revitalization, a movement formed in the 1960s
to recognize the dignity of the recipients of public assistance. Rather
than undergo verification through investigation, welfare recipients
were trusted to voluntarily report their qualifications, a process
termed “Declaration,” to satisfy eligibility requirements.30 War on Pov-
erty policies,31 progressive lawyering, and urban militancy, among
other factors, assisted in temporarily halting home visits.32 By the early
1970s, however, the welfare rights movement fractured33 and surveil-
lance tactics flourished.34
Two key court decisions reflecting that fracture curtailed the pro-
tection of dependent children and their families’ privacy. In 1970, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in Dandridge v. Williams (“Dandridge”),35 deferred
to a state legislature’s allocation of federal public welfare funds that
included a family size cap. While Dandridge broadsided the ability of
the term privacy conjures a vision of isolated individuality that is entirely foreign to
mothers receiving public assistance, who depend on a complex web of interaction with
neighbors and social workers to maintain their families. GILLIOM, supra note 8, at ch. 5.
The term, however, is useful as a catchall for a number of constitutional rights and their
resonance in popular culture.
27. Christopher Manning, African Americans, http://www.encyclopedia.chicago
history.org/pages/27.html (last visited May 4, 2009).
28. GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 26–27.
29. Id. at 27 n.5, 155 n.31. The “man in the house” restriction was outlawed in King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968).
30. GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 28–29.
31. See Special Message to the Congress Proposing a Nationwide War on the Sources
of Poverty, 1 Pub. Papers 375 (March 16, 1964); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2981 (1964).
32. GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 28–29.
33. See id. at 110 (describing the failure of the National Welfare Rights Organization
to adapt the language of welfare rights to its clients’ language of needs, mothering, and
childcare).
34. Id. at 30.
35. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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courts to smoke out the ends and justifications of specific welfare poli-
cies through higher scrutiny, a year later Wyman v. James (“Wyman”)36
carved a specific exception into the Fourth Amendment, which has
since widened to a gulch, with the poor, students, and probationers
on one side and most Americans on the other.37 However, the Court
in Wyman did not so much sanction a new technique of investigation
as qualify an old one—the home visit by a friendly advisor.
1. Help Comes Knocking: Parrish and Wyman
During the brief Declaration era, a lucid moment on the bench
fought through the smokescreen and protected the home. Sitting en
banc in 1967, the California Supreme Court in Parrish v. Civil Service
Commission (“Parrish”)38 outlawed the use of unannounced, early
morning, mass raids of welfare recipients’ homes without individual-
ized suspicion.39 An Oakland, California social worker refused to take
part in Operation Bedcheck, as the raids were known, and was fired.
The court declared the raids illegal because the consent of welfare
recipients, even if given, could not stand in the face of the threat to
their livelihood if they refused. The pressure to submit to authorities
overrode the residents’ ability to meaningfully consent, according to
the court. The opinion also cited the heavy burden on the govern-
ment to justify waiver of constitutional rights, as recognized in the re-
cent decision in Miranda v. Arizona,40 explicitly drawing a connection
between the rights afforded suspected criminals and those of welfare
recipients.41 This connection would surface a few decades later in Cal-
ifornia’s highest court.
Several years after Parrish, the first major Supreme Court decision
on home visits came down on the side of the government.42 Calling
the official making a home visit a mainly rehabilitative helper, rather
than investigative prosecutor, the court in Wyman found no search,
and alternatively, no unreasonable search even if there were one.
Among myriad factors in the majority’s decision were (1) the non-
36. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
37. See Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Recent Cases, Constitutional Law—Fourth Amend-
ment—Ninth Circuit Upholds Conditioning Receipt of Welfare Benefits on Consent to Suspicionless
Home Visits, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1996 (2007) (arguing Sanchez and other decisions character-
ize welfare recipients as different from “the rest of the citizenry”) [hereinafter Recent
Cases].
38. 425 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1967).
39. Id. at 225, 231.
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. Parrish, 425 P.2d at 270.
42. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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invasive nature of the search (“no snooping”); (2) the fact that it was a
planned visit with notice; (3) that it was a personal, rehabilitative ser-
vice with close contact between the client and officials; and (4) that it
safeguarded the public’s interest in the child, in stopping fraud, and
in accounting for public funds.43 The majority recognized that mass
raids could present a more grave danger to Fourth Amendment
rights, referencing Parrish,44 but likened the case at hand to a request
by an Internal Revenue Service agent in auditing a taxpayer—that is
to say, a situation where consent is not burdened by any possible dep-
rivation of constitutional magnitude.45
In his dissent, Justice Douglas blamed the government for trying
to “buy up” the constitutional rights of welfare recipients, and called
out double standards facing recipients of government largesse, with
more respect afforded farmers receiving “subsidies,” for example,
than for impoverished residents receiving “charity”—like welfare
checks.46 In their dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan noted that
federal regulations do not require visits to ensure eligibility, and rec-
ommended getting the needed information from other, less invasive
methods.47
2. California Scheming: The Return of Home Visits
In the decades succeeding Wyman, the notion of an entitlement
to welfare, a form of “new property” that the Court has called more
than just “mere charity,”48 nearly disappeared, though it was not ex-
plicitly overruled.49 For instance, Congress attempted to legislate enti-
tlements out of existence in the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,50 which gave states more
power over welfare distribution through block grants from the federal
government.51 In the context of a growing economy and increased
criticism of welfare, and following a massive drop in crime rates, local
governments in Southern California renewed home visits of welfare
43. Id. at 318–25.
44. Id. at 326.
45. Id. at 324.
46. Id. at 326–28, 332.
47. Id. at 347.
48. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970); see, e.g., Wyman, 400 U.S. at 332
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
49. Recent Cases, supra note 37, at 2000 n.44 (charting the course of Professor
Charles Reich’s conceptualization of welfare payments as “new property” from Goldberg to
Sanchez).
50. Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
51. Morgan, supra note 14, at 237.
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recipients, this time carried out by members of the law enforcement
community.52
In 1997, San Diego County instituted a program, dubbed “Project
100%,” mandating home visits of every county welfare applicant not
suspected of ineligibility.53 Receipt of welfare benefits was condi-
tioned on acquiescence to the “walk-through”54 by a police-trained,
badge-carrying “peace officer.”55
In 1999, following a television news broadcast on welfare fraud,
the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors directed the Depart-
ment of Public and Social Services to restart home visits in the style of
San Diego’s.56 A district attorney’s office representative noted that Los
Angeles County had stopped conducting home visits years earlier due
to budget constraints.57 The new program forced applicants to un-
dergo home visits before enrolling in CalWORKs, the state’s welfare
program.58
3. Legal Response: All Kinds of Affirmation
Two lawsuits were filed in response to these programs. In both
courts largely followed the guidance of Wyman, which sanctioned
home visits that are mainly rehabilitative, not investigative, and identi-
fied the purpose of these visits as falling under a Special Needs
Doctrine.
a. Smith and Special Needs
In 1999, a suit was filed in state court against Los Angeles alleging
violations not only of state requirements and statutes, but also state
and federal constitutions.59 In that case, Smith v. L.A. County Board of
52. See MARTIN J. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING THE CRIMINAL: CULTURE, LAW, AND POLICY
IN ENGLAND, 1830–1914, at 258–60 (1990) (arguing that success of anti-crime policing in
late- and post-Victorian Britain led to the diversification of law enforcement efforts into
new fields of behavior with less overtly criminal nature). The police’s new responsibilities
beckoned more extensive tasks of social regulation, and the creation of new crimes, includ-
ing larceny. Id.
53. Recent Cases, supra note 37, at 1996.
54. Id.
55. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 934 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006).
56. Greg Gittrich, Welfare Claims To Be Checked; Home Visits Aim to Stem Widespread Fraud
in L.A., LOS ANGELES DAILY NEWS, Apr. 6, 1999, at N4.
57. Id.
58. Smith v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 702–03 (Ct. App.
2002).
59. Id. at 702.
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Supervisors (“Smith”),60 the court disagreed and declared that state reg-
ulations gave the county the power to set welfare monitoring policy.
The county’s social services manual allowed for home visits and, in-
deed, demanded them if there was no other way to get the required
information.61 State law did not pre-empt, conflict with, or “fully oc-
cupy” the area of law, and the court deferred to the agency’s interpre-
tation of its regulations.62 The county needed no individual reasons
for the home visits because their purpose was not “fraud
investigation.”63
On the constitutional issues, Smith followed Wyman’s reasoning in
calling the search, if it was reasonable. It distinguished Parrish on
grounds that these visits were not early morning mass raids, but gave
notice to residents, and the investigators were not instructed to
snoop.64 As far as snooping, investigators were “prohibited from open-
ing drawers or closets during their walk-through of the home.”65 The
court, however, denied finding anything “improper or insidious in an
eligibility worker making observations that bear on an applicant’s enti-
tlement to benefits under CalWORKs.”66 It also applied the Special
Needs Doctrine, “a rapidly expanding area of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.”67
Developed out of Wyman,68 the Special Needs Doctrine recog-
nizes “exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable.”69 In applying the exception, the
court first looks to the purpose of the government action and whether
it fulfills general law enforcement goals, like crime control.70 If, in-
stead, the government action serves a special need, the threshold is
met and courts move to the second prong, balancing the nature of the
individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest with the character of
60. 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (Ct. App. 2002).
61. Id. at 703.
62. Id. at 707–10.
63. Id. at 711.
64. Id. at 713.
65. Id. at 712.
66. Id. at 710.
67. Id. at 711–12.
68. Recent Cases, supra note 37, at 1997.
69. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); accord
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
70. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2006).
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the special intrusion and the extent to which the intrusion promotes
legitimate government interests.71
The Supreme Court officially adopted this exception in Griffin v.
Wisconsin,72 where a probationer’s home was searched for a weapon
based on reasonable suspicion, not the usual, higher, probable cause
standard. The court decided government supervision of the proba-
tioner during the “genuine rehabilitation period” after his imprison-
ment ensured public safety and negated the warrant requirement.73
The probationer’s relationship to the state was found to affect his con-
stitutional rights, including his Fourth Amendment right to freedom
from unreasonable searches.74
In some cases of seizure, not even “reasonable suspicion” is
needed, just an assurance that the seizure is not arbitrary, capricious,
or intended to harass.75 The exception applies to work-related
searches of employees’ desks and offices,76 searches of highly regu-
lated businesses like vehicle dismantlers,77 and of the body cavities of
prisoners. As specifically applied to students, the exception also ap-
plies to backpack searches78 and mandatory drug testing without indi-
vidualized suspicion.79
In Smith, Los Angeles County presented the important purpose of
deterring welfare fraud.80 This special need, beyond mere law en-
forcement, qualified the searches under a lower standard of suspicion.
Additionally, deterring fraud overrode the “minimal” privacy intru-
sion at issue in Los Angeles.81
b. Sanchez Defends Her Home
In a second challenge to the new round of home visits in South-
ern California, plaintiffs Rocio Sanchez and other Project 100% appli-
cants in San Diego filed a suit in federal court charging violations of
the state and federal constitutions and state welfare prohibitions
71. Id. at 926–27.
72. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
73. Id. at 875.
74. Id. at 879.
75. In re Randy G., 28 P.3d 239, 239 (Cal. 2001).
76. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
77. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699–703 (1987).
78. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–42 (1985).
79. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (supporting the lower
court’s finding that student athletes were at the head of the school’s drug culture).
80. Smith v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (Ct. App. 2002).
81. Id. at 712–13.
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against “mass and indiscriminate” home visits.82 The decision in
Sanchez v. County of San Diego (“Sanchez”),83 panned by critics as “driven
by stereotypes of the poor,”84 purports to follow the Wyman decision
and the Special Needs Doctrine it initiated.85
Project 100% home visits were not searches, according to the ma-
jority. As the Supreme Court found in Wyman, the panel decided
home visits were not criminal investigations, as there were no criminal
penalties for refusing to consent to the visits.86 Alternatively, if they
were searches, they were reasonable.87 The Ninth Circuit panel’s ma-
jority saw many similarities between the Wyman factors proving reason-
ableness and the Sanchez facts, including: (1) the public’s interest in
caring for dependent children and stopping welfare fraud; (2) the
state’s goal of rehabilitation; (3) the fact that the investigation did not
involve a uniformed authority or police officer; (4) the fact that re-
sidents had advance notice in writing that a visit would take place; and
(5) the fact that there were safeguards against “snooping.”88
The searches were also reasonable, the court noted, because they
fell under the Special Needs exception. Citing the fact that no one
had been subjected to criminal prosecution for welfare fraud resulting
from a Project 100% home visit, the Sanchez court saw the visits’ pur-
poses as facilitating welfare administration, not general law enforce-
ment.89 Therefore, Project 100% met the threshold requirement for
Special Needs consideration.
Applying the second prong, the balancing test, the court dis-
missed the individual’s privacy interest and the sanctity of the home as
82. Recent Cases, supra note 37, at 1997.
83. 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006).
84. Recent Cases, supra note 37, at 2003 (arguing the court treats welfare distribution
as an “above-baseline” activity); see id. at 2001 (arguing that judges stereotype public assis-
tance as a special deviation above the “normal baseline” of government activity, and there-
fore allow the government to attach strings detrimental to recipients’ constitutional
rights). This analysis is based on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Robert M.
O’Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L. REV. 443
(1966). California courts recognize this doctrine. See Robbins v. Superior Court, 695 P.2d
695 (Cal. 1985). Justice Fisher found it was violated by San Diego’s Project 100%. See
Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 942 (noting the doctrine “limits the government’s ability to exact waiv-
ers of rights as a condition of benefits, even when those benefits are fully discretionary”).
85. Recent Cases, supra note 37, at 1997–98.
86. Id. at 1997.
87. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 923.
88. Id. at 923–24. The applicants are not told, however, “the exact date and time the
visit will occur.” Id. at 919.
89. Id. at 926.
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dependent on the individual’s “relationship to the state.”90 Welfare is
only given if the recipient establishes a “physical residence in the state
and actual presence” at the address in the county petitioned for assis-
tance. This, in the majority’s eyes, along with the consent offered to
the home visits, reduced the applicants’ expectation of privacy in their
homes.91 The safeguards and statistical evidence of the searches’ effec-
tiveness in reducing welfare fraud were enough to satisfy the second
prong and justify the “administrative” searches under the Special
Needs Doctrine.92
Of the three judges on the Sanchez panel, Justice Fisher dissented.
Whereas the visits in Wyman were “primarily rehabilitative,” he wrote,
the visits in Sanchez were performed by law enforcement-trained peace
officers from the district prosecutor’s office. In addition, the officers
were allowed to ask to peek into drawers and trash bins, seeming to
flout the Wyman ban on snooping.93 Justice Fisher also rejected the
equation of welfare recipients and other Special Needs Doctrine sub-
jects vis-a`-vis the state. “Whatever legal relationship exists between the
fraud investigator and the welfare applicant is wholly distinguishable
from the relationship between a student and school administrators . . .
a probationer and his probation officer . . . or the government as em-
ployer and its employees.”94 He noted that only the probationers had
been subjected to Special Needs searches in their homes,95 where pri-
vacy interests are at their “zenith.”96
Of the three judges who heard Sanchez, only Judge Fisher voted to
grant the petition for rehearing en banc.97 Once the full court was
advised of the petition, a majority voted against the rehearing. Judge
Pregerson dissented from the decision not to rehear. His dissenting
opinion, joined by six other justices, highlighted factual differences
between Wyman’s “home visits” and the “walk throughs” in San Di-
ego.98 He accused the panel of ignoring “over thirty-five years of inter-
vening law” and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in its attack on the
privacy rights of the poor.99
90. Id. at 927.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 933–34.
94. Id. at 941.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 940 (quoting United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2006)).
97. Id. at 966.
98. Id. at 967–69.
99. Id. (“The government does not search through the closets and medicine cabinets
of farmers receiving subsidies. They do not dig through the laundry baskets and garbage
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C. New Reason for Home Visits: California Goes Far to Increase
the Work Participation Rate
The welfare reform in 1996 required states, in order to receive
the maximum amount of federal funds, to prove to the federal gov-
ernment that fifty percent of their welfare recipients were working,
and other percentages were “compliant” or participating in various
ways. Now, recipients who are derelict in complying with program re-
quirements without good cause and refuse to enter into a compliance
plan are sanctioned. But the states want the federal money and, there-
fore, need the sanctioned recipients included in the Work Participa-
tion Rate (“WPR”). California is a “strong county” state, meaning the
counties have discretion in welfare, food stamp, and other social pro-
grams.100 Each county’s welfare department has an “anti-fraud unit”
which refers egregious cases to the district attorney’s office.101 The
counties also use “sanction reengagement strategies”102 to keep the
sanctioned or non-compliant clients from negatively counting against
the state’s WPR.
1. The Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Reauthorization
Dance
California modified CalWORKs in response to the federal govern-
ment’s reauthorization of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families in
2006. A home visit program in Los Angeles County, home to the larg-
est population of welfare recipients in California, became a model for
the entire state. The GAIN Sanction Home Visit Outreach Project
trains senior caseworkers to engage clients in a three-step program
with the final step being a home visit.103 Through GAIN, the county
“served” more than 9100 non-compliant or sanctioned clients during
a five-month period in 2005 and 2006.104 Eighty-one percent of those
pails of real estate developers or radio broadcasters. The overwhelming majority of recipi-
ents of government benefits are not the poor, and yet this is the group we require to
sacrifice their dignity and their right to privacy. This situation is shameful.”). For more
information on the “double standard” applied to the poor in constitutional interpretation,
see Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of
Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2008).
100. Telephone Interview with Anastasia Dodson, supra note 6.
101. Id.
102. CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., FINAL REP. TO THE LEG. ON STRATEGIES TO INCREASE THE
WORK PARTICIPATION RATE 6 (2009), available at http://www.cdss.ca.gov/cdssweb/entres/
pdf/SB84FinalReport.pdf.
103. SUBCOMM. NO. 3 AGENDA, MAY 4, 2006, SUBCOMM. ON BUDGET & FISCAL REVIEW 26
(Cal. 2006), available at http://www.sen.ca.gov/budget/Sub3/2006Sub3.pdf.
104. Id. at 26–28.
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served had their cases “resolved,” meaning the county contacted them
and reached some result other than sanction. Nearly a third (29.7%)
of the resolved cases achieved “participation/agreement to partici-
pate” and almost one-quarter (24.6%) showed “good cause” for non-
compliance.105 Nearly six percent—714—of those served received
home visits.
2. Home Visits for All
Recently, counties have unabashedly promoted home visits, even
if they have to contract out for third parties to conduct them, and
papered over their clients’ aversion to them. Since 2006, most coun-
ties in the state—at least thirty-eight—have used home visits as part of
their initial meetings with applicants for public assistance or as a “ree-
ngagement strategy.” With “intensive outreach” programs the coun-
ties, according to a report to the legislature on how to increase the
WPR, “have had success at reengaging sanctioned individuals; and in
most cases, the individuals appreciate the attention given to their
case[s].”106
The report recommended home and off-site visits—yet another
tactic the strong counties use to reach their clients—for several
reasons:
[T]he client is in a comfortable environment and may be more
willing to share valuable information about barriers previously un-
identified . . . . [T]he case worker or community partner may be
able to identify barriers the client has through observation in the
client’s home; and it can give the client a sense that they are valued
by the county’s efforts to personally inquire about their needs.107
Best practices included using trained social workers or “designated
staff who are personable” to conduct visits.108
Despite the report’s claim that clients are comfortable undergo-
ing the visits and feel valued by them, it recommends as a “promising
practice” for reengagement that clients not be told the “specific date
and time of the visit.”109 It seems that clients tended not to be home
when the workers were supposed to arrive, calling into question the
report’s insistence that clients appreciate the outreach.110
105. Id. at 28.
106. CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 102, at 7.
107. Id. at 25–26.
108. Id. at 27.
109. Id. at 7.
110. Id. at 27. The Sanchez and Wyman decisions justified home visits in part because
clients were given notice beforehand, as opposed to the Parrish-type unannounced raids
that were struck down. This new round of unannounced visits by California counties, there-
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Other problems were identified. Worker safety was an issue in
some neighborhoods. When “contracted service providers” executed
the outreach, some contract goals were not met.111 Either clients were
not receptive to strangers showing up at their doors purporting to
work for the state, or the contractors could not do their jobs. Also,
various clients returned to sanctioned status after curing, and others
refused services, choosing to remain sanctioned.112 Due to the recent
struggling economic conditions, and the increase of welfare caseloads,
many counties have curtailed their outreach programs.113
Counties across the state reach into citizens’ homes, sometimes
unannounced, and boast about the practice to the state legislature.
For having a “special need,” the counties treat their right to enter peo-
ples’ homes in a cavalier way.
II. Changing Power Relations: From Discrete to Discreet
While the jurisprudence on home visits developed over the past
half-century in the United States, criminal justice and welfare adminis-
tration systems became explicitly intertwined.114 Postmodern French
philosopher Michel Foucault presaged this linkage as necessary for
the continued relevance of the penal system.115 He believed complex
modern institutions, like the penal and welfare systems demand a
fuller explanation than simply “legal” or “social” viewpoints can pro-
vide.116 These systems use many of the same techniques and accom-
plish many of the same ends.117 Due in part to this confluence, this
Comment is a multi-disciplinary study, or “genealogy.”
fore, raises a concern of whether the counties are following California and federal constitu-
tional guidelines.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Telephone Interview with Anastasia Dodson, supra note 6.
114. See Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
643 (2009).
115. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 22 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (“Today, criminal justice functions and
justifies itself only by this perpetual reference to something other than itself, by this un-
ceasing reinscription in non-juridical systems.”).
116. Id. at 23 (explaining the pitfalls of a simply legislative and penal, or conversely,
social, history of criminal law enforcement and punishment).
117. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 1: AN INTRODUCTION 141
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1976); see also Frank Munger, Poverty,
Welfare, and The Affirmative State, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 659, 663 (2003) (book review)
(“[S]tate surveillance and public provision for welfare were created by the same impulse.”).
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A. Genealogy: “Effective History” Beyond Good and Bad
A genealogy, or “effective history” based on comprehensive re-
search, does not attempt to reveal “origins” or purport to find the
ideal behind the real, or even posit that the past actively operates in
the present.118 Religion, morals, science, and “Truth” are exposed as
relative properties, products of particular times and places in his-
tory.119 In the tradition of philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche and
Michel Foucault, authors using this method resist the temptation to
write a single course of progress onto the past, or put the conclusion
before the prologue. A genealogist emphasizes the singularity of the
accidents, mistakes, and events that “gave birth to those things that
continue to exist and have value for us.”120 Rather than reducing
events to their lowest common denominator and destroying their uni-
queness and character, genealogists locate incidents in their respec-
tive time and place, preserving uniqueness and idiosyncrasy.121 Rather
than attempt objectivity, the genealogist passionately pursues a
remedy.122
B. The New Governance
Is there a greater reason, besides deterring welfare fraud or rais-
ing the WPR, why the government is so interested in getting into the
homes of the poor? How does a chunk of the budget of a massive state
like California depend on whether some poor people have jobs?
Aren’t we as a society more interested in the lifestyles of the rich and
famous than poking around the homes of the destitute? The answer
lies in the order and the production of a society functioning like an
efficient industrial machine.123 Michel Foucault, in particular, offered
a robust vocabulary and way of understanding the changes in social
and governmental institutions that led to highly ordered industrial
states. An overview of his ideas helps to explain how we developed
118. Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY,
PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 144–46, 152 (D.F. Bouchard ed., 1977).
119. Ian Johnston, There’s Nothing Nietzsche Couldn’t Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist
(Monty Python): A Lecture in Liberal Studies (Dec. 11, 2000), http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/
introser/nietzs.htm.
120. Foucault, supra note 118, at 146, 156–57 (describing Friedrich Nietzsche’s histori-
cal sense as “slanted”).
121. Id. at 157.
122. Id.
123. See WIENER, supra note 52, at 191 (describing the shift in late Victorian English
social policy away from fearing and oppressing the destitute toward recognizing their use
in an internationally competitive, fit, and efficient nation state).
Spring 2010] WELFARE SEARCHES & STATE POWER 1023
suspicion of the lower classes that led to such stereotypes as the
Harvard Law Review found in Sanchez.124
The late theorist Foucault continues to garner respect from such
diverse jurists as intellectual property and emerging technology schol-
ars,125 to Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner.126 Foucault’s geneal-
ogy of the French penal and punishment system showed their shift
from a sovereign system to a disciplinary mode of ordering society.127
The former emphasized liberty and maintained order through specta-
cles of power and inflictions of pain and fear, embodied in the “tech-
nology” of public executions.128 The latter induces individuals to
produce knowledge, and establishes and communicates norms
through surveillance technology.
1. Sovereign Power: Old School and Discrete
A sovereign power, perhaps run by a single individual, creates spec-
tacles, like great fanciful crowning ceremonies or gruesome public ex-
ecutions, to reinforce its superiority. The sovereign often depends
upon a very visible, physical presence through its agents to instill or-
der through fear and punishment.129 In terms of the history of public
assistance, the “overseer of the poor” might have filled this role. The
exercise of sovereign power is discrete; the populace is only called
upon occasionally to participate. They are fully aware of when and
where they come into the gaze of the powerful.130
Foucault uses startling examples from the history of public execu-
tion in eighteenth century France to illustrate sovereign power at
work. Capital punishment was sometimes accomplished through “an
almost theatrical reproduction of the crime,” and sometimes even in
the same place where the crime had been committed.131 The purpose
124. Recent Cases, supra note 37.
125. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors,
66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 185 (1997) (“Michel Foucault was one of the most interesting
postwar French philosophers and social theorists. His work was wide-ranging, sometimes
obscure, indeed deliberately so, and his historical generalizations would have been insuf-
ferable if they were not so often provocatively useful.”).
126. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 23, 182 (1992) (explaining Foucault’s
analysis of contemporary sexuality as a social construction); accord Boyle, supra note 125, at
186 n.20.
127. See Foucault, supra note 118.
128. See id. at 7–12.
129. Id.
130. John F. Covaleskie, Power Goes to School: Teachers, Students, and Discipline, PHILOSO-
PHY OF EDUCATION 1993, available at http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-Yearbook/93_
docs/COVALESK.HTM.
131. FOUCAULT, supra note 117, at 44–45.
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was punitive as well as political, because it restored the invincibility of
the sovereign, whose political body had been injured by the crime
against the state.132
Sovereign power depended on visibility and publicity. The sover-
eign took things very personally, and his subjects knew it.
2. Disciplinary Power: New School and Discreet
Times would change. A new, more pervasive, always-acting form
of power took hold, heralded by such ordered displays as military re-
views, which stressed the discipline of the masses, rather than the
power of the sovereign.133 The discreet new power is well encapsu-
lated in the Panopticon.
Under English philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s design, the Panop-
ticon is a prison wherein a single watcher, placed in the center court-
yard of a circular arrangement of cells, can view the entire contents of
each cell at all times.134 The prisoners, unaware of when they were
being watched, are forced to assume the omniscience of the guard.
Rather than momentarily recognizing the state’s power over them, as
in a sovereign system, the prisoners come to know the norms of the
dominant society and ingest them subconsciously, constantly. They
“internalize the gaze.”135 The silent, omnipresent and internalized
watcher replaces the tangible, temporal sentry of the sovereign. But
the watcher is not passive. Prisoners are constantly examined and ob-
jectified, creating more knowledge and enabling more efficient
subjection.136
C. More than Just a Number: Individualization and Normalization
In large part, the social sciences help clarify what our conception
of the true and normal is through categorization, examination, and
individualization.137 In “the age of infinite examination and compul-
sory identification,”138 individuals—perhaps most importantly those
individuals at the bottom of the social ladder, or welfare state—create
“truth.”
132. Id. at 47–48.
133. Id. at 188–89.
134. Id. at 200.
135. See id. at 187.
136. Id. at 204.
137. Id. at 184–85.
138. Id. at 189.
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In sovereign societies, individualization is greatest at the top, with
the powerful and prestigious.139 Literature celebrates and immortal-
izes deeds of superior strength.140 In disciplinary systems, individuali-
zation is “descending” and power becomes more anonymous and
functional as it is practiced on those further down the social ladder.
Power is exercised by surveillance, rather than ceremonies; people are
compared to “norms” rather than their ancestors. The child is more
individualized than the adult.141 Instead of honoring princes, kings,
and queens, a disciplinary system creates stories like those of Charles
Dickens’ about impoverished youths. The characters’ very disorder
and weakness draws attention.
The government, as well as other institutions, develop, use, and
promote certain norms to make a society that is an efficient, ordered,
and industrious machine. With information gained through confes-
sions and examinations, social sciences create norms. People are sub-
jected to those norms through schooling and employment, as well as
less visible techniques, such as surveillance and monitoring.
In History of Sexuality, Foucault illustrated how the disciplinary
process of individualization produces bodies that depend on the crea-
tion of norms. Formerly, sovereign teachers transmitted the truth of
sexuality down the ladder to the naı¨ve, through sexual contact in the
discourse of pleasure.142 Now, however, truth is a vehicle for sex and
pleasure and the production of knowledge goes up the ladder, from
the populace to psychologists and other social scientists. People be-
come cases and “analyzable objects” subject to the imposition of
norms.143 In religious and other contexts, though, people act as con-
fessors, accepting the norms and individualizing themselves in rela-
tion to them.144 For example, Christians find new pleasures in giving
up information in accordance with detailed confession guides, result-
ing in rich enumerations of sins.145 Rather than emanating from an
invincible, visible, and voluble sovereign, power in religious confes-
sionals is exercised by “the one who listens and says nothing.”146 The
139. Id. at 192.
140. Id.
141. Id. Consider the notion of finding your inner child and the importance of aid to
dependent children.
142. FOUCAULT, supra note 117, at 57–58. Foucault said this is the way erotic truth is
historically taught in the East, Rome, and the “Arabo-Moslem societies.” Id.
143. MARGARET A. MCLAREN, FEMINISM, FOUCAULT, AND EMBODIED SUBJECTIVITY 146
(2002).
144. FOUCAULT, supra note 117, at 61–62.
145. See id. at 63–64.
146. Id. at 61–62.
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power relationship is consummated when the confessors give up their
secrets. Confessors are participating, accepting, and creating norms
with what they say.
To contribute to the establishment of societal norms, which are
presented as our only way of knowing who we are and what we are
supposed to do to sustain our world, each individual must reveal him
or herself. However, these norms often only perpetuate synthetic con-
ceptions of truth, and coercively promote the whims of the powerful.
As society moved from a discrete system of visible power relations to a
discreet system based on unseen pressures and surveillance, the poor
were put under the microscope. Suspicion increased to the point that
even charity became “scientific. Instead of simply accepting that the
poor were on the bottom of the social ladder social scientists began to
expect them to produce knowledge that the government would use to
produce new norms and greater expectations. Techniques like home
visits, however, ignore these complex interactions and instead treat
welfare applicants and recipients like supplicants receiving unusual at-
tention, in the form of the simplest charity.147
III. No Quarter: Applying Foucault to Home Visit Rationales
Ironically, the placement of welfare recipients into a class of per-
sons worthy of individualization and central to the production of
knowledge negates the need for “individual” suspicion. The new disci-
plinary power inverts the pyramid of suspicion, placing the whole
weight of the social system on the shoulders of the poor and disor-
derly. They are analyzed and diagnosed ad infinitum.148 It runs
against the grain of our society to let the poor retain secrets and pri-
vacy, and assert their own identity according to their own norms. Yet
this is precisely what must happen if they are to “transform themselves
in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfec-
tion, or immortality.”149
A genealogical critique of the judicial interpretations supporting
“home visits” can start with the Special Needs Doctrine.
147. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326–28, 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (equating
welfare checks with farmers’ subsidies, rather than charity); see also Recent Cases, supra
note 37, at 2001.
148. Ina Jaffe, ‘The Soloist’: Living with Mental Illness on Skid Row, NAT’L PUB. RADIO,
(Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103198515 (“A
survey in Los Angeles County found that half of the homeless say they suffer from a mental
illness.”).
149. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Technologies of the Self, in A SEMINAR WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT 18
(L.H. Martin, H. Gutman & P.H. Hutton eds., 1988).
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A. A Special Need for Protection
Court rulings put welfare fraud monitoring into the category of
Special Needs, letting the government forego individualized suspi-
cion. This development directly correlates with Foucault’s notion of
descending disciplinary power relations. At such a functional level of
power relations, the poor are expected to anonymously succumb to
surveillance and individualization. Suspicion is assumed, as part of
everyday life.
Recognizing this assumption will help the courts dismantle the
Special Needs Doctrine and increase the explicit level of suspicion
necessary to enter the homes of the poor, as a safeguard against the
state and society’s drive to mold individuals to synthetic norms. This
nation is not to be “standardized.”150
1. ‘Relationship with the State’ Is a Vestige of Sovereignty
Any method of legal analysis that puts a relationship with the gov-
ernment on a pedestal, singling it out for special consideration, flies
in the face of the way our society functions. Law no longer retains its
central role in power relations as it did under the sovereign.151 How-
ever, courts give the government leeway to deal with the categories of
persons in the Special Needs exceptions because of those parties’ “re-
lationship to the state.”152 The fetishistic attention paid to an individ-
ual’s relationship with the government must come into the post-
modern era.
Power is diffuse and almost impossible to recognize, while resis-
tance can be difficult to muster, let alone recognize.153 There are
many contemporary examples of diffusion, from home visits to the
prison system—even detainment and treatment of suspected terrorists
in military prison at Guantanamo Bay—has had segments contracted
out to third party service providers.154 Officials conducting home visits
in Sanchez needed only minimal identification and did not wear
150. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
151. FOUCAULT, supra note 117, at 90 (“We must break free from the image of the
theoretical privilege of law and sovereignty . . . and construct an analytics of power that no
longer takes law as a model and a code.”).
152. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (allowing random
drug testing of public high school athletes).
153. See Covaleskie, supra note 130 (“There is no single or visible locus of disciplinary
power against which to direct one’s resistance.”).
154. See CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 102; accord Class Presentations, Poverty
Law, U.S.F. School of Law (Fall 2009) (on file with author).
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uniforms.155 Since welfare reform, counties across the nation are
pushing welfare recipients to the low-wage labor market as fast as pos-
sible. The government should not have its cake and eat it, too, by
claiming a special relationship with welfare recipients, only to cast
them aside by deferring to third parties once the actual monitoring
and assistance takes place.
The Special Needs Doctrine should be limited to situations
clearly contemplated in the Constitution.156 Otherwise, courts should
recognize the diffusion of power and not obsequiously identify indi-
viduals’ “relationship with the state,” in its many veiled forms.
2. The True Purpose: Constructing Norms
When courts assert that welfare clients consent to giving up their
homes to state officials in return for public assistance, they legitimize
the confessor-confessee power relationship. Courts fail to recognize
that the power at work in those situations does not extend the author-
ity of the state, but instead is much more slippery and insidious. The
courts put the state’s awesome power to accuse, condemn, and reha-
bilitate into the hands of those meant to do no more than survey.
Home visits were initially upheld as supporting the general reha-
bilitative purpose of welfare laws, but this justification took a
subordinate position to the deterrence of fraud. In application, Cali-
fornia’s home visits have failed to deter much fraud and have exposed
their utility only as disciplinary surveillance tactics to examine and
mold the poor.
The Wyman determination of home visits as non-criminal yet “re-
habilitative,”157 finds no support in modern legal definitions of the
word “rehabilitation.”158 Still, in Sanchez, the government said the na-
ture of the searches was rehabilitative, in part because no one had
been prosecuted for welfare fraud as a result of a visit.159 The court
found that the rehabilitation noted in Wyman only meant the searches
supported the general purposes of welfare laws. But the agents carry-
ing out the searches in Sanchez had actually been trained not to give
out advice to welfare clients, leaving the rehabilitative purpose on
155. See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 924 (9th Cir. 2006).
156. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (allowing diminished rights for those convicted
of crimes).
157. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
158. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 604 (3d Pocket ed. 2006) (defining rehabilitation only in
criminal, evidentiary, or bankruptcy contexts).
159. See supra Part I.B.3.b.
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weak legs.160 Moreover, when Los Angeles recently terminated its
home visit program due to its cost and ineffectiveness at deterring
fraud, nothing was said about the loss of “rehabilitative” services.161
Rather than punitive or rehabilitative measures, the searches
mainly seek to deter fraud and constructively teach the poor to con-
form to government norms. The techniques exceed examination and
punishment, but promote confessions, persuading clients to reveal
themselves to the silent, observing authorities, who teach the clients
how to order their lives. Every time they look around their houses,
clients might see through their observer’s eyes, internalizing the gaze
of the welfare department’s fraud or eligibility investigator. These
constructive power relations have little to do with the state’s legal, pu-
nitive, or sovereign power—or the individual’s relations with the
state—and everything to do with the establishment of norms and dis-
ciplinary order.
Whatever the definition of rehabilitation in a non-criminal, wel-
fare context, its process should not encompass coercive, automatic,
and anonymous reconditioning of individuals through violating their
most sacred environs. The rehabilitative, punitive, or deterrence bene-
fits of home visits to welfare recipients and society as a whole, both as
theorized and in application, do not outweigh the cost of invading
privacy and pressuring the poor to accept imposed norms.
B. Outreach or Overreach?
There are positive aspects to intensive outreach to welfare recipi-
ents in some contexts.162 Hidden needs and barriers are discovered
and, in many cases, home visits are not necessary to resolve the sanc-
tions.163 There is a constructive benefit, too, if one believes the Wel-
fare Directors Association’s claim that clients feel valued by the
county’s efforts to contact them personally. Home visits, however, are
not necessary to achieve these goals. In good economic times, when
the county could afford the effort, less than six percent of the inten-
sive outreach cases studied in Los Angeles received home visits.164 Los
160. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 932 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
161. Telephone Interview with Lynn Martinez, Staff Attorney, W. Ctr. on L. and Pov-
erty (Nov. 19, 2009).
162. See CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 102, at 32 (explaining various counties’
outreach to former welfare recipients through home visits to inform them about remain-
ing opportunities for assistance once they have met their time limit for federal aid).
163. Telephone Interview with Anastasia Dodson, supra note 6; see also CAL. DEP’T OF
SOC. SERVS., supra note 102.
164. SUBCOMM. NO. 3 AGENDA, supra note 91, at 28.
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Angeles’ program was recently discontinued due to lack of effective-
ness and funds.165 Why should the courts allow the Constitution to be
violated just to defend such a little-used and ineffective procedure,
much less San Diego’s badly reviewed “walk through” program?166
Project 100%, with its mandatory monitoring, hews closer to the
basest power relations exercised in disciplinary systems. It deals with
the welfare recipients anonymously, teaching them to see with the
state’s gaze. But society learns little from surveillance of those it finds
most suspicious; the welfare clients know too well what the state wishes
to see. Moreover, the state’s methods can be clumsy and clients (and
agents) are always able to “scam” and get around the rules.167 The
surveillance only burdens those under the microscope and the social
workers who might wish to help them.
C. A Better Way
Not all engagement of clients must be normalizing or coercive.
Within a disciplinary system, Foucault has allowed for the possibility of
individuals freely giving their information.168 “[T]he process of telling
the truth does not necessarily result in domination.”169 In fact, a legal
discourse has emerged that takes the lead for welfare clients who tell
the truth about their families’ situations and the boxes in which that
government assistance places them.
165. Telephone Interview with Lynn Martinez, supra note 161.
166. Telephone Interview with Anastasia Dodson, supra note 6.
167. See generally GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 95–98 (discussing how welfare recipients
create unreported income and social workers skirt the rigid categories of the state’s elec-
tronic computation system to increase clients’ welfare benefits); see also JAMES SCOTT, SEE-
ING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED
92–93 (1998) (analyzing states’ tendency to ignore the more unruly and random aspects of
modernity when designing administrative systems). Any state system will have flaws; when
the U.S. criminal justice system seeks the truth, errors are inevitable. Keith A. Findley,
Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL
L. REV. 893, 895 (2008). In the United States, however, “[b]enefits programs, in fact, make
greater systematic efforts to detect and publicly disclose occurrences of fraud than most
other agencies.” David A. Super, The Quiet Welfare Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp
Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1271, 1294 (2004). Anecdot-
ally, fraud comes from within as well as without; the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office
lists internal fraud just below “recipient welfare fraud” on its website (http://
da.co.la.ca.us/wf/default.htm#internal) and convicted one worker of embezzling more
than $700,000 in public funds in 2002. Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office: Wel-
fare Fraud—Convictions, http://da.co.la.ca.us/wf/conv.htm (last visited May 5, 2010).
168. MCLAREN, supra note 143, at 146.
169. Id. at 147.
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Those in need can construct their own norms free from coercion,
diagnosis, and discipline.170 The legal aid movement of the 1960s,
with its push toward “Declaration,” rather than investigation of welfare
eligibility, accomplished this by marrying the law with a respect for the
everyday needs of welfare recipients.171 Though today the “language
of rights” lacks clout among many welfare clients,172 there are forms
of resistance that respond in kind to the new form of power that oper-
ates silently and stealthily across society.173 Through resistance, the
poor are able to be productive, promote their daily needs, build iden-
tity, and form a strong ethical ideology.174
By articulating the ideology, as it were, one welfare client shuns
the language of constitutional rights, preferring to emphasize needs,
saying, “[O]ur kids come first. And if I need something to get through
the end of the month with them, I will do it.”175 Appalachian welfare
clients mentioned a few of their tactics of “resistance,” including earn-
ing money by cutting hair or babysitting, moving kids between house-
holds, and neglecting to report financial gifts from their parents.176
Viewed together, these seemingly isolated incidents form a pattern of
activity very effective in bringing about positive results.177 The clients
largely regret having to take what they see as illicit, yet necessary, steps
to protect their families. Their attitudes conform to what some schol-
ars label an “ethic or discourse of ‘care,’” which promotes principles
of interdependence and responsibility, rather than individualism and
rights, and even the storied right of privacy.178
170. See generally GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 6–7 (framing the statements of welfare cli-
ents in a discourse of care); see also THE SOLOIST (DreamWorks Pictures 2009).
171. GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 83.
172. Id. at 78–80 (referring to privacy-rights based legal consciousness among welfare
clients).
173. Id. at 99–100, 107 (describing the “politics of everyday resistance” as consistent,
though uncoordinated, patterns of subterfuge and evasion that cut across social classes,
and noting Foucault’s arguments that “public, organized forms of opposition fit older pub-
lic displays of the state’s power”).
174. Id. at 135.
175. Id. at 93.
176. Id. at 93–95.
177. Id. at 103.
178. Id. at 109; see also Laura T. Kessler, The Politics of Care, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y
169, 169 (2008) (arguing that care giving itself can be a form of political resistance); id. at
198 (describing vision of a social welfare state that recognizes the multifarious actors in-
volved in child-rearing and like situations characterized by “human dependency”); compare
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in The Human Condi-
tion, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008). In her alternative to equal protection analysis,
Fineman posits a “vulnerable subject” to “replace the autonomous and independent sub-
ject asserted in the liberal tradition.” Id. at 2. Stressing the universal concept of vulnerabil-
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In this way, welfare mothers create their own norms with concrete
political implications. The law should recognize and support such
productive energy and ideas rather than rubber-stamping society’s es-
tablished suspicions of it. Perhaps courts could recommend that
“strong county” welfare agencies distribute grants to groups of clients
in the style of Third-World microfinance lender Grameen Bank,
which is expanding into the United States.179 Such lending encour-
ages women entrepreneurs to support each other.180
Conclusion
Each historical period puts its own emphasis on different qualifi-
cations for receiving public assistance. The locus of welfare distribu-
tion has shifted from the streets, to the poorhouses, to the home. As
society became more ordered, the poor were more highly analyzed
and individualized, even by friendly visitors. Later, a legal defense
movement upheld welfare rights, but the Supreme Court failed to
protect the home, siding with the special interests of the government.
Most recently, expanding police powers and welfare outreach led to
an increase in home visits and promotion of their use in mobilizing
participants to meet federal work and training requirements, despite
their failure to effectively deter fraud.
It is difficult to strike the proper balance between the sanctity of
the home and the engagement of welfare recipients in the pursuit of
self-sufficiency. The Supreme Court initially struck a course for reha-
bilitation in home visits, but has since backpedaled, allowing the visits
to become “walk throughs.” Given the overwhelming pressure on the
poor to surrender to examination and individualization, in addition
to the multifarious and constructive power relationships that do not
depend on the government, courts ought to include welfare clients
with the “rest of us” and protect the home as much as possible.
ity gives her thesis more political weight than a theory characterized by dependency—a
more transitory condition—she argues, and one that is often relegated to family caretak-
ers, “beyond the scope of state concern.” Id. at 11. Her vulnerability thesis, though, recog-
nizes the important role that state institutions play in conferring assets to protect us against
risk. Id. at 15.
179. Barbara Kiviat, Can Microfinance Make It in America?, TIME MAGAZINE, Jan. 11, 2010,
at 38.
180. Id.
